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A survivable system is able to fulfil its mission in a timely manner, in the presence of 
attacks, failures, or accidents. It has been realized that it is not always possible to anticipate 
every type of attack or failure or accident in a system, and to predict and protect against those 
threats. Consequently, recovering back from any damage caused by threats becomes an 
important attention to be taken into account. This research proposed another recovery model 
to enhance system survivability. The model focuses on how to preserve the system and 
resume its critical service while incident occurs by reconfiguring the damaged critical service 
resources based on available resources without affecting the stability and functioning of the 
system. There are three critical requisite conditions in this recovery model: the number of 
pre-empted non-critical service resources, the response time of resource allocation, and the 
cost of reconfiguration, which are used in some scenarios to find and re-allocate the available 
resource for the reconfiguration. A brief specifications using Z language are also explored as 
a preliminary proof before the implementation .. To validate the viability of the approach, 
two instance cases studies of real-time system, delivery units of post office and computer 
system of a company, are provided in ensuring the durative running of critical service. The 
adoption of fault-tolerance and survivability using redundancy re-allocation in this recovery 
model is discussed from a new perspective. Compared to the closest work done by other 
researchers, it is shown that the model can solve not only single fault and can reconfigure the 
damage resource with minimum disruption to other services. 
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ABSTRAK 
Suatu kebolehtahanan sistem mampu mencapai misi dalam masa yang ditetapkan 
apabila berlaku serangan, kegagalan dan kemalangan. Hakikatnya, segala ancaman seperti 
serangan, kegagalan dan kemalangan selalunya tidak mungkin dapat dijangka. Oleh sebab 
itu, penyelesaian terhadap sebarang kemusnahan yang disebabkan oleh pelbagai ancaman ini 
menjadi satu keperluan yang penting untuk diambil perhatian. Kajian ini mencadangkan satu 
model penyelesaian untuk meningkatkan kebolehtahanan sesuatu sistem. Model ini 
memfokuskan kendala bagaimana mempertahankan sistem dan meneruskan perkhidmatan 
yang kritikal semasa berlakunya insiden dengan cara mengkonfigurasi semula sumber 
kemusnahan perkhidmatan kritikal berdasarkan sumber yang ada tanpa memberi kesan 
terhadap kestabilan sistem. Terdapat tiga keadaan kritikal yang diperlukan untuk 
menghasilkan model penyelesaian iaitu bilangan perkhidmatan kritikal, masa tindak balas 
sumber dan, kos pengkonfigurasian semula dimana semua ini telah digunakan dalam 
beberapa senario untuk mengatur sumber yang sedia ada untuk pengkonfigurasian semula. 
Spesifikasi ringkas menggunakan bahasa Z telah dikaji untuk menghasilkan pembuktian awal 
sebelum dilaksanakan. Pengambilan "fault-tolerance" menggunakan penstrukturan semula 
yang lewah dalam model penyelesaian ini telah dibincangkan dari perspektif baru. 
Berbanding dengan penyelidikan-penyelidikan yang telah dilakukan oleh para penyelidik, 
dapat disimpulkan bahawa model ini bukan sahaja boleh menyelesaikan satu kesalahan tetapi 
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INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the conducted research. First, the motivation of building a survivable 
system is given. The main objective of the research and the approach proposed come in the 
next section. Then, an outline of the remaining chapters of this thesis is described. 
I. I Background 
At the present time, computer systems are used in distributed, often malicious, 
environments. In this condition of unprotected setting, system vulnerabilities invite misuse, 
intrusion, and other forms of attack. Despite the best effort of security practitioners, no 
amount of system hardening can assure that a system that is connected to an unbounded 
network will be invulnerable to be faulted [Ellison, 1999a] [Ellison, 1999b] [Ellison, 1999c], 
and it is known that malicious attacks (actions and software or hardware) are becoming more 
smart and feasible. 
Traditional security technologies were not designed to protect systems against the 
evolving threats that result from the interconnection of systems that were not designed to be 
interconnected in the first place. These systems typically employ a hierarchical design 
approach, appropriate for systems with centralized administration and coordination. But it 
cannot provide a survivable solution in the context of unbounded systems. The discipline of 
system survivability and security can help ensure that such systems (medical, financial, 
manufacturing, telecommunications, etc) can deliver essential services and maintain essential 
properties such as integrity, confidentiality and performance, despite the presence of 
intrusion. 
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Unlike the traditional security policies that requ1re central control instance or 
administration, survivability is intended to address unbounded network environments. 
Survivability is a new field of study that allow systems to survive, limit damage, recover, and 
operate robustly in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents that, alone or in combination 
threatens the system's ability to fulfil their mission. Furthermore, survivable systems should 
be able to evolve and adapt to the environment where they provide services. 
A key characteristic of survivable systems is their capability to deliver essential 
services, fulfil its mission in a timely manner and in the face of threats. In some cases, if an 
essential service is lost or destroyed, it can be replaced by another service that supports 
mission fulfilment in a different but equivalent way. To maintain that capability, survivable 
systems have '3R' [Ellison, 1999a] [Mead, 2000]: Resistance, Recognition and Recovery. In 
aclclition, adaptation is the fourth property. Resistance means how the system repels the 
attacks, i.e. by system and user authentication, encryption, firewalls. Recognition describes 
how the system detects the attack (including intrusion) and understanding the current state of 
the system, i.e. by virus scans, system monitoring configuration or network monitoring. 
Recovery means how the systems recover from damage as early as possible to fulfil its 
mission as conditions permit. Recovery is selected as the focus on this research. Adaptation 
or evolution is needed to reduce effectiveness of future attacks by improving system 
survivability based on knowledge gained from intrusions. It can be by adaptive filtering and 
logging. 
INTRODUCTION 3 
Tahlc 1 ·1: Key Properties of Survivability 
Key Properties Description Example 
User authentication 
Resistance to attacks Strategies for repelling attacks Stochastic diversity of 
programs 
Strategies for detecting 
Recognition of attack and the 
intrusions and understanding Recognition of intrusions 
extent of damage 
the current state of the system, usage patterns 
including evaluating the extent Internal integrity checking 
of damage 
Strategies for restoring 
compromised information or 
functionality, limiting the 
Recovery of full and critical 
extent of damage, maintaining 
Replication and re-
or, if necessary. restoring 
services after attack initialization of data 
critical services within the 
time constraint of the mission, 
restoring full services as 
condition permit 
Adaptation and evolution to 
Strategies for improving 
system survivability based on Incorporation of new pattems 
reduce effectiveness of future 
attacks 
knowledge gained from for intrusion recognition 
intrusions 
The informal notion of a "threat" that has been used is what is referred to formally in 
the literature as a fault or error. The process of building a system in such a way that certain 
faults do not arise is fault avoidance. Building systems that are able to react in requisite way 
to prescribe faults is fault tolerance. Survivability requires robustness under conditions of 
intrusion, failure, or accident; and it includes the concept of fault tolerance. This research is 
on the subject of developing fault tolerance to enhance system survivability. 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
Based on the introduction, there are several issues 111 survivability that can be 
summarized: 
I. No system is invulnerable to fault. 
2. Some faults are typically destroying the resources of critical services; making the services 
cannot be continued with resources that remained. 
3. The need for a mechanism to ensure the system delivers the critical services despite the 
presence of faults. 
4. Recovering the destroyed resources of critical services as soon as possible when 
conditions permit becomes a must to fulfil the mission of the system when incident 
occurs. 
1.3 Motivation 
The above issues manifest the dangers of system intrusions in interconnected 
environment, thus recovery of destroyed critical service to sustain mission of the system 
becomes important. The recovery will be those of restoring the damaged critical service 
resources in efficient ways as condition permit to increase survivability of the system. In fault 
tolerance, survivability can be deliberated as requiring very specific error recovery after a 
fault. If the system can tolerate the fault and recover back to good condition and ultimately 
keep the affected services running all along, the system will survive. This motivates the 
author to explore methods to improve the survivability of systems in fault tolerance 
perspectives. 
An approach to achieve this is by: I) To model the fault handling process, 2) Model a 
resource reconfiguration using redundant resources, and 3) Simulate alternative scenarios to 
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show different conditions of resource reconfiguration. This work focuses on developing such 
a recovery model for critical service resource reconfiguration. 
1.4 Objective 
A primary objective of this research is to develop a recovery model that can be used by 
specially a system administrator to enhance system survivability by reconfiguring the faulted 
critical service resources. Along with this, some sub-objectives include: 
• Construct a formal specification for the recovery model using Z formal specification 
language to pre-prove the proposed model. 
• Develop a simulation application to demonstrate how this model works with some 
hypothetical data. 
I ,5 Methodology 
The goal is to model the recovery process of a system when its critical serv1ce 1s 
subjected to damage. The basic idea of full survivability is the system remains alive to a 
certain condition of failures occurring anywhere in the system [Ho, 2007]. For this reason, 
some relevant concepts in current literature will be used. Firstly, the State Transition 
Diagram of the system have been built, which is the simplification of Popstojanova's work 
IPopstojanova, 200 I]. By taking into account the time factor [Lin, 2005] [Wang, 2006], cost 
factor [Moill·a, 2000] [Park, 2004] [Wang, 2006], resource re-allocation/reconfiguration 
concept [Wang, 2006] [Aung, 2006], and resource redundancy concept [Knight, 1998] 
!Sullivan, 1999] [Aung, 2006], a different approach in fault tolerance perspective is 
developed to return the system back to normal condition. 
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The proposed model will assign resource redundancy at the outset and keep a table for 
each critical and non-critical service nodes. The model implements a technique of 
reconfiguring the destroyed resources using redundant or pre-empted resources at the fastest 
possible time with minimum service disruption. Since the system is referred to Real-Time 
system, the stability must be maintained. The stability of the entire system is based on active 
and accurate functioning of each and every service nodes. The system becomes unstable 
when at least one active service nodes becomes dysfunctional and its resources are pre-
empted or denied access. It is assumed that error detection and assessment will be handled by 
other mechanism such as operating system. Since the objective is to recover the system when 
incident occurs, the system shall degrade gracefully [Park, 2005] when recovery process is 
running. Since most of the recovery techniques placed after the system fails to run, this is a 
clifJ'erent thought to put a process in graceful degradation mode. In this research, services and 
processes are used interchangeably. 
To design a system that capable to make decision more quick and accurate than a 
human could, a new concept called autonomic computing is adopted in this research. 
Autonomic computing is a computational method that less real-time human intervention 
I Lewandowski, 200 1]. In this work, some hypothetical data is proposed for the simulation 
model. 
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1.6 Thesis Overview 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter two provides a general overview of enabling technologies used to address the 
proposed approach and its implementation. 
Based on the issues highlighted in chapter one and two, chapter three presents the 
recovery model. The model and algorithms needed are extensively explained, included the 
queuing model for multiple faults and system. 
Chapter four shows the specification of the model us1ng Z formal language, a 
simulation model program is provided in this chapter as well. Some case studies are tested 
and explored. 
Chapter five and six, draw the conclusions of the research and some recommendations 
ror future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter elaborates some concepts related to this work and presents the state of the art 
and methodologies used in designing the recovery model: survivability, recovery and fault 
tolerance, redundancy and resource reconfiguration, and real-time system. 
2.1 Related Work 
There are different approaches for resolving survivability problem in term of 
modelling. Stm1 with Sullivan (1999) who developed dynamic models of infrastructure 
information system based on the notion of control. The author wrote that dealing with 
disruptions, no matter what the cause, minimizing the loss aggregate value to users and 
ensuring that the system remain have to be taken into account. Moitra (2000) proposed a 
complete episodes simulation model for managing survivability of networked information 
system, including the responses of the system to attacks, to solve problem in [Sullivan, 
1999]. The model addressed several detailed aspects of the attack incidents, such as the type 
of attack, the number of attackers, and possible correlation between the rate of incidents and 
the type of incidents. The return of the system to the normal state when an incident occurs is 
one of the accomplishments which should be stressed in the future. It also mentioned in 
[Zhao, 2006] who proposed a novel quantitative analysis method for network survivability 
based on grey analysis to assess the best affiliate degree and survival probability of every key 
service. The method obtained synthetically analysis for the network survivability by 
analyzing the changes of every key service's survivability. It stated that how to realize the 
real-time analysis of network survivability and recover the fault service will be the further 
research. 
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Returning back to normal condition in survivable system is explored briefly by [Jha, 
2001]. Jha (2001) use a Constrained Markov Decision Process (CMDP) to form the basis of 
survivability analysis, which is composed of model-checking, Bayesian network analysis, 
probabilistic analysis and cost-benefit by presenting in a single framework of systematic 
method. The author mentioned a better distinction between survivability and traditional fault 
tolerance. Almost similar as [Jha, 2001], Koroma (2003) proposed a quantitative approach 
using a generalized model (Markov chain) to achieve how the system will function in the 
wake of failures, what will be the impact of failures on the user, and how to overcome these 
failures. The node connectivity is the only background of that work. McDermott (2005) 
presented a quantitative survivability modelling for high-consequences system based on 
intruder attack potential. The consideration of recovering system based on concurrent faults 
rather than sequential faults is mentioned on this work. 
There are some studies on survtve by recovery. Started by Knight (1998) who 
introduced a recovery concept based on fault tolerance and reconfigurable system on critical 
infrastructure in the face of catastrophic faults where the effects of the faults cannot be 
masked using available resources. Several suggestions on how a recovery related to 
reconfigurable process are presented in this work. It is also mentioned that for future system 
characteristic, more redundancy might be built since the cost of hardware continues to drop. 
Park (2004) introduced a hybrid recovery model that is compiled from static and dynamic 
recovery model. Besides providing more robust survivability services than two other models, 
the hybrid model addressed the system downtime drawback in static model by using 
redundant server buffer. It is mentioned when error happened to a server; the buffer will take 
over the service for a brief period until the new immunized server is initialized. And if the 
transition period is long, multiple buffer servers might be used. For further adaptation, 
multiple immunized servers are generated. However, the simplicity of the model becomes 
lower. 
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Wang (2006) developed a new method ERAS (Emergent Response Algorithm for 
Survivability of Critical Services) to sustain the operation of critical service of a system after 
attack. The algorithm takes the requirement of emergency response as background to find the 
feasible scheme of reconfiguration from the view of needed resources as early as possible 
and minimum use of pre-empted non-critical service resource number. It is a new thought 
and method for survivability and very effective to use. However, the algorithm is only 
considering single attack on critical service and reconfiguring from non-critical servtce 
resources. To reconfigure optimally, Ghiasi (2004) presented an efficient optimal algorithm 
for minimizing the run-time reconfiguration delay of executing an application on 
dynamically adaptable system. It is able to minimize the total application run-time from 
many classes partial reconfiguration delay. The author mentioned that the effect of number of 
reconfiguration is the next investigation 
Aung (2006) presented a cluster recovery model to increase the survivability level of 
internet applications. The author used redundancy method to create a hot standby system in 
face with disasters. It also provides a mathematical model using semi-markov model. The 
model is able to reduce the time to get the users back to work, but it did not mention the 
integration of response time and throughput with downtime cost. 
Hiltunen (200 I) advocated the use of a standard fault tolerance technique - redundancy 
to increase the survivability of service. The author mentioned that the fundamental idea 
behind using redundancy to improve survivability is with multiple resources enforcing a 
given attribute; the attribute should remain valid if at least one of the resources remains 
uncom promised. 
Recovering a system is extremely complex. Error recovery planning is used to address 
the after failure conditions when the system is offline. By paying attention to the detail from 
previous works, it is possible to increase the likelihood of successful recovery and keep 
maintaining the faulted service to survive the system [Mead, 2000]. 
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2.2 Survivability 
The definition of survivability is not always consistent or even present in the current 
literature discussing survivability [Westmark, 2004]. The standard definition by [Ellison, 
1999a] [Ellison, 1999b] [Ellison, 1999c] [Byon, 2000] [Caldera, 2000] [Knight, 2003] is 
used as the basis to explain what survivability is. Survivability is the capability of a system to 
jit!fil its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of a/lacks, failures, or accidems. 
The term system is used typically in a large-scale network system, not limited to 
computer system, which includes many components (nodes) that are required to deliver 
services to the end user. The system environment and the critical services that the system 
provides are defined for this survivable network system. The system can be bounded or 
unbounded. The system is unbounded if all nodes that provide the critical services are not 
known. 
Mission refers to a set of high-level requirements or goals and not limited to military 
settings. Any successful organization or project must have a vision, whether they are 
expressed implicitly or explitcitly. Mission can be judged by the expectations of the user. 
Mission is related to critical services that system provides. For example, cheque clearing is a 
critical service of a banking system. It means the mission of a survivable banking system is to 
continue providing this service despite the presence of faults [Jha, 2001]. 
Timeliness is a critical factor that is typically included in the high-level requirements 
that define a mission especially in real-time system. For example: for a networked distributed 
system, a required service may be a specified response time to the end user. For a time-
critical system, the description of a required service may include the maximum time 
allowable between user request and system response. 
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The terms auack, failure, and accident can be considered as threats or incidents or 
intrusions. It is something that may prevent the system from providing services to the user in 
the prescribed time or may prevent the system from providing the services at all. [Westmark, 
2004 J categorized the threat as: I) Accidental threats: software errors, hardware errors, and 
human errors, 2) Intentional or malicious threats: sabotage, intrusion, or terrorist attacks, and 
3) Catastrophic threats typically do not allow delivery of required service to the user, which 
includes acts of nature (thunderstorms, hurricanes, lightning, flood, earthquake, etc.), acts of 
war, and power failures. 
Another term that can be added into survivability definition is business case 
l Wesunark, 2004]. A business case is required for each survivability definition. There is an 
extra cost associated with the design, development, and operation of a survivable system. The 
business case is developed based on the cost/benefit analysis from which the threat is 
identified and required responses are specified. 
To develop a survivable system, some analysis steps must be followed [Fung, 2005] 
[JV!ead, 2000]. The first step is to focus on understanding the system's goal. Any violation of 
this goal means a compromised system. Next is to identify the critical components and 
resources in the services, based on the goals and the consequences if failure happened. The 
third step is to identify the compromised components. Finally identify components that both 
prove and possible to be compromised after the previous compromised one. 
2.3 Recovery and Fault Tolerance 
In survivability terms, recovery is the ability of a system to restore compromised 
services within the time constraint of the mission as condition permit [Ellison, 1999b]. 
Recovery also contributes to a system's ability to maintain critical services during failure 
condition [Ellison, 1999aj. Requirements for recoverability are what most clearly distinguish 
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survivable systems from secure system. Traditional security leads to the design of systems 
that rely almost entirely on hardening for protection. Once security is breached, damage may 
follow with little to stand in the way. The ability of a system to react during an active 
intrusion is central to its capacity to survive an attack that cannot be completely repelled. 
Recovery is thus crucial during exploration and exploitation phases of intrusion. 
One concept in recovery is fault tolerance. Fault tolerance is a mechanism that enables 
a system to continue operating properly in the event of failure of (or one or more faults 
within) some of its components [Tirtea, 2006]. If its operating quality decreases at all, the 
decrease is proportional to the severity of the failure, as compared to a naively-designed 
system in which even a small failure can cause total breakdown. Fault tolerance is sometime 
called graceful degradation which means that the recovery of system's capability and 
services will be placed in degraded mode. 
Some damages may not be detected immediately, thus the damages may propagate 
until they are detected. Once they are detected, the recovery process must fix them one by 
one or simultaneously. Recovery also depends on the severity of the damage (i.e., how many 
resources have been affected), the recovery strategies and the remaining undamaged 
resources that are in place [Wang, 2006]. Damage assessment, recovery schemes for different 
degrees of damage severity, and redundant resources for reconfiguration can ensure the 
surviv<lbility by recovery. 
This research separates the error detection and error recovery processes in which both 
are usually embedded with the single engine service [Florio, 200 1]. 
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2.4 Redundancy and Resource Reconliguration 
Redundancy is a key component in providing any kind of tolerance especially in 
survivable system [Hiltunen, 2003]. The term redundancy has its roots in both fault tolerant 
hardware/software and distributed systems. It generally refers to the extra resources allocated 
to a system that are beyond its need in normal working conditions [Wang, 2003]. In 
engineering, redundancy is the duplication of critical components of a system with the 
intention of increasing the reliability of a system. Redundancy is different from replication, 
which is just one type of redundancy which we are all concerned to: physical resource 
redundancy, beside software, information, or time redundancy. Redundancy can help the 
system avoid single points of vulnerability, including vulnerabilities and weaknesses in 
distributed security algorithms [Hiltunen, 2003]. 
A survivable system must be proactive as well as reactive [Wells, 2000]. Assigning a 
sufficient redundant resource for each service according to pre-specified policy in a system is 
proactive. The reactive is when the system needs redundant resource, due to resource failure 
of a service, it can be re-allocated successfully. 
Resource reconfiguration or re-allocation plays a major role in survivable system and 
the proper use of redundant resources is highly important [Herzberg, 2004]. The re-allocation 
must be dynamic and policy based. This process is a successor of autonomic response to 
resolve lacking resource after failure. In [Koopman, 2003], a reconfiguration process to heal 
a system having suffered from fault without human intervention is considered to be self-
healing by self-reconfiguration mechanism. 
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2.5 Real Time System 
Real-time system [Greenwood, 2005) is any system that is both logically and 
temporally correct. Logical correctness means the system satisfies all functional 
speci f·ications. Temporal correctness means the system is guaranteed to perform these 
runctions within explicit time frames. Fault-tolerant systems meet the criteria as real-time 
systems because fault detection and fault recovery inherently have deadlines. That is, the 
rault must be detected within a certain period of time after it occurs, and the fault must be 
corrected within a certain period of time after it is detected. Fault recovery may also have an 
expected start time. 
The notion of real-time is often interpreted to imply really fast. This interpretation is 
not accurate. Real-time does not necessarily mean fast and fast does not necessarily mean 
real-time [Greenwood, 2005]. Suppose a document must be sent from Kuala Lumpur to 
Jakarta, and two delivery systems are available: surface mail with a guaranteed three-day 
delivery time or e-mail with a guaranteed 7 minute delivery time. The e-mail delivery is in 
the order of magnitude faster than surface mail, but that does not necessarily mean it qualifies 
as a real-time delivery system. It is the required delivery deadline that ultimately establishes 
whether the real-time system definition has been met. For example, both systems are real-
time systems if the deadline is six days because both are logically and temporally correct. 
However, neither one is a real-time system if the deadline is 3 minutes because neither one is 
temporally correct. 
Real-time systems are classified as hard or soft. Hard systems have catastrophic 
consequences if the temporal requirements are not met up to and including complete system 
destruction. In fact, if the hard system is safety-critical, failure could lead to injury or even 
death. Conversely, soft systems only have degraded performance if the temporal 
requirements are not met. The classification of a fault-tolerant system, in particular, depends 
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on the nature of the faults and the consequences for failing to detect and correct them in a 
timely manner. Suppose an error results in system. If the system can survive this condition 
for up to 5 minutes, the fault recovery must be completed within 5 minutes to prevent further 
damages. 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter provides the reader with sufficient background information to understand 
the foundations and concepts elaborated in the rest of this thesis. The rest of the sections 
discuss the approach used in designing the survivability model, recovery and fault tolerance, 
redundancy and resource reconfiguration within the context to real-time systems. 
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CHAPTER 3 : MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter gives a detailed description of the recovery model and its actions. Firstly, the 
addressed problem is described. The recovery model is proposed to solve the problem .. 
3.1 Problem Definition 
The problem can be described as: There is a Real-Time System (RTS) which has 
critical services and non-critical services. Some critical service resources are destroyed by a 
fault. To maintain the stability and mission of the system, the system has adaptive abilities to 
recover by re-allocating available resources dynamically to critical service. The recovery 
process works under RTS circumstance, hence the duration of the process is a great concern. 
The duration included the response time and the usage time. This work focuses on the 
response time of the available resources. That is the first requisite condition. The problem is 
to find out how to reconfigure the critical service resources which can ensure sustainable 
operation of critical services. It brings along to the next requisite condition, cost. The cost of 
recontiguration is calculated by the number of resources and cost of resource. It is assumed 
that error detection (monitoring) and damage assessment are taken care by some other 
mechanism such as control system architecture [Knight, 1998]. It is assumed that there will 
be no further error when a critical service being faulted. Figure 3-1 provides a typical 
example of interconnected system structure that contains a master resource controller, some 
critical services and some non-critical services, where the recovery could be applied. 
Resource reconfiguration computation will be done by the recovery engine. 
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Real Time System 
Figure 3-1: Real-Time System Structure 
The critical service differs in three levels: High, Medium and Low level depending on 
its function at the system. The replacement resources to reconfigure the damage can be taken 
from I) Redundant Resources of critical service, 2) Unused/idle Redundant Resources of the 
system, 3) Released/Redundant Resources of non-critical service, and 4) Pre-empted 
Resources of non-critical service that are currently being used. They are depicted in Figure 
3-5. 
To avoid instability of the system and more cost while reconfiguring, the response time 
or avai I able resources should be as quick as possible and the cost of available resources 
should be as cheap as possible. Furthermore, the number of pre-empted non-critical service 
resources. if need to be utilized, should be as few as possible, this is considered the third 
requisite condition. 
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3.2 System Transition Diagram 
Figure 3-2 depicts the state transition diagram which is used as a framework for 
describing the behaviour of the system. The system contains 4 states: Good stare, vulnerable 
stare, fault stare, and recovery state. The system moves to vulnerable state if a user violates 
security policy to access a resource without authorization. Vulnerability is the property of the 
system, its attendant software and/or hardware, or its administrative procedures, which 
causes it to enter vulnerable state [Popstojanovan, 200 1]. The system enters fault state when 
vulnerability is successfully exploited and the fault unmasked by simple fault tolerance. In 
the next state, recovery state, the system will be recovered. To limit the damage and protect 
the system from Denial of Service while maintaining the critical services, it sets into graceful 
degradation mode. Critical services are defined as the functions of the system that must be 
maintained to meet the system requirements even when the failures occurred [Ellison, 
1999aJ. In order to survive the critical service, it is critically assumed the recovery process 
will always be successful; hence there is no fail state. 
System 
recoveree 
Figure 3-2: State Transition Diagram 
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3.3 Recovery Model 
It will often be the case that the effects of a fault will leave the system with greatly 
reduced resources (processing services, communications capacity, etc) and substantial 
changes in the services provided to the users will be necessary. The ability to tolerate certain 
types of fault is the only practical approach to achieve survivability. In this work, there are 
several fault types: single fault, multiple sequential faults, and multiple concurrent faults for 
multiple critical services. Besides considering single fault for certain critical service, multiple 
sequential faults and multiple concurrent faults must be taken into account as well. In 
multiple sequential faults, the system has to reconfigure the reconfigured system and m 
multiple concurrent faults, reconfiguration must be simultaneous and consistent in order to 
maintain stability. In this thesis, reconfiguration refers to resource redistribution and not 
structural or topological reconfiguration. 
The recovery engine defines the requirements for the availability of the system. It 
guarantees that tasks can be performed exactly at the required moment, access to resources is 
possible at the required moment and that resources are not demanded unnecessarily or are 
withheld. 
3.3.1 Recovery Action 
Figure 3-3 described the recovery action that is mapped into the recovery state. The 
process starts with diagnosing the destroyed resources of the critical services. The diagnosis 
part will determine where the damage occurred. The analysis pan calculates the amount of 
damaged resources. In order to move back to good state, the available resources to 
reconfigure critical services resources must be found and re-allocated. 
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'~ Faull State 
Recovery State 
I Diagnose I 
I Analyze I 
i 
-
I Allocate I I 
Good State 
figure 3·3: Modules in the Recovery Action 
There is a priority queue of reconfiguration request inside analysis process. If a 
multiple concurrent fault occurs, the request will be queued [Mosse, 2003] based on its 
arrival time and the critical service level. Hence, the analysis will be on a sequential basis as 
depicted in Figure 3-4. 
Request Queue 
I cso, I . . . I cso, II cso,ll cso.l 
Figure 3-4: Queue Abstract Structures 
The process to find the available resource for reconfiguration is based on the tabular 
method. The four types of resources described in previous sections are defined in three 
tables, master resources allocation table, critical services table, and non-critical serv1ces 
table. These three tables will be created automatically (dynamic table creation) when the 
system begins operation, and will be destroyed when the system cease to exist by the OS or 
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by another process within the current system. For the purpose of our discussion we assume 
the table creation process is spawned by the recovery engine. 
The master resource allocation table (Table 3-1) shows the total resources currently 
used and allocated for redundancy inside the running system. Required resources means the 
resources that the system needs to run all the services i.e., the total of all resources used by 
the services, critical and non-critical. Used-redundant means the redundant resources that are 
currently used by the system's service and unused-redundant means the idle redundant 
resources that are not currently used by the system. 
Table 3-1 : !\•laster Resource Allocation table 
Resource 
~ . ·-
s, ~. sL .... sa j 
·Required (MQR) .. .. -
--
. 
Used Redundant (MUR) ; ~ .. 
Unused Redundant ( MUNR) 
- ·-- --. 
. t·- .! 
The critical services resources table (Table 3-2) shows the resources used by the 
service, redundant resources that are available for that service, and the resources that are 
destroyed by fault. 
Table 3-2 : Critical Service Resources table 
Resource R, 1 R, I: R• ! 
• Resource Currently Used ( CSCU) 
Redundant ( CSR) 
. Damage ( CSD) 
. 
The non-critical services resources table (Table 3-3) shows the resources used by the 
service and the resources that are released whi Je the services are in progress. Resources are 
taken-up and released when it is not required. 
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Table 3-3 : Non-Critical Service Resources table 
Resource ' 
- - -. ' 
r, r2 r, 
:Resource CutTently Used' ( NCSCU} '' . ' 
. -
Released ( NCSR) . '
' - . -
--- ' 
.. -· ,-
In the allocation process, there are four scenarios to be analyzed after an error/damage 
occurs to the critical service resources that find the available resources for reconfiguration. 
They are: 
I. Redundant Resources available with critical service. 
The process will check the redundant resources of the critical service. If it is available, 
then the problem can be fixed without affecting any other services i.e. the required 
resources can be used for damage recovery. 
2. Redundant resources available with the system. 
If there are insufficient redundant resources with the critical service, it will check the 
unused redundant resources of the system. If it is available, then allocate the available 
resources. 
3. Released resources available with non-critical services. 
If there are insufficient unused resources of the system, it will check the unused or 
released resources of the non-critical service. If it is available, then allocate the 
available resource .. 
4. Resources are pre-empted from non-critical services. 
If there are insufficient released resources of the non-critical services, the process will 











Figure 3-5: Resource Availability and Reallocation 
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Figure 3-5 depicts all of the possible resource availability for reconfiguring the critical 
service resource as mentioned earlier. 
3.3.2 Resource Balancing 
The most important factor in resource reconfiguration is resource balancing in order to 
maintain the stability of the system. Take note that the service is functional when there is at 
least one active resource to support it [Einozahy, 2004]. The system has three tables of 
resources. When the system is activated and the resource allocated, the table will note every 
allocation into those tables. For example, if there is a critical service, that needs four 
resources to run the service, then those four resources will be allocated and noted in the 
critical service's resources table (resource currently used row) and in the master resources 
allocation table (required resource row). The same goes to non-critical service. Thus, if the 
engine allocated four resources for critical service and four resources for non-critical service, 
there will be eight required resources in the master table. For redundant resources of critical 
service, initially it must be at least equal to one resource. 
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The tables are updated dynamically at run-time and when fault happens. For example, 
if there are some resources of the non-critical services that have been released, the used 
resources count must reflect the change. If some resources of the critical service are 
destroyed, the used resources count must be deducted as well. The required resource of the 
master table does not change. In our model it is assumed that there will be no further faults to 
the affected critical service node while it is being reconfigured. 
The following equations describe the situation. 
CSR,.,,(a) ~I, NCSCU .,(/1) ~I 
MQR, (y) = i, CS y.b (a)+ i, NCS ""·'(/]),where a= b = c 
CS,_, (a)= CSCU ,_.(a)+ (CSR,.• (a)- CSCU ,_.(a))+ CSD,..b (a) 





The redundant resources of critical services and currently used resources of non-critical 
services must be at least equal to I unit are shown in (I). The required resources of master 
table are the total of required resources of critical services and redundant resources of non-
critical services, as shown in (2). Equations (3) and (4) show the required resources, both 
used and redundant of the critical and non-critical services. 
3.3.3 Sell" Reconfiguration 
Koopman (2003)defined four general aspect categories of self-healing system problem 
space: fault model, system response, system completeness, and design context [Koopman, 
20031. Recovery is placed under system response category. The proposed recovery model in 
this thesis is developed to recover a faulted service by reconfiguring the damaged resources. 
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In other word, by combining all those ideas, the model can be called as self-reconfiguration 
model for survivable system. 
3.3.4 Diagnosis and Analysis Process 
In this section, the process of recovery will be explained in detail, from diagnosis to the 
allocation process. After diagnosing the error and identifying where the error has taken place, 
the analysis process will queue the request in a reconfiguration request priority queue. If 
CSDr." is the damaged critical service resources yon resource b, CSD,. .• (a) shows the 
damaged amount, CJ; is the arrival time of i th damage to the reconfiguration request queue, 
I, is the level of i th damaged critical service and Q is the queue, the queue will be: 
Q: I (CSD,. .• (a), q0 , 10 ), (CSD, .• (a),q" 1,), ... , (CSD,. .• (a),q; ,()) 
When a multiple concurrent fault occurs, the resource allocation will be done in a 
concurrent manner, as shown in Figure 3-6. Once the sequential analysis for one fault is 
completed the process moves on to the allocation process. The search for and re-allocation 
will be processed simultaneously for all the requests in the queue. 
I cso, I . .. I cso,ll cso,ll cso I ! Allocation 
Figure 3-6: Concurrent Allocation Queue 
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3.3.5 Allocation Process 
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Figure 3-7: Graph or The Services 
In Figure 3-7, the Critical Service connected to Non-critical Service by cost of taking 
the NCS resource and NCS response time in a tuple (c,t). The amount of master resource 
notated in r, CS resource notated in a and NCS resource notated in fJ. 
The target is to find the feasible scheme of reconfiguration (o), where .Q = {o, , ... , t5,}, 
from possible available resource with minimum response time(T), minimum cost(C)and 
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minimum reconfiguration resource number(N). Let n be the set of all possible feasible 
scheme. Hence the basis model will be: 
minN(c\"),b"E Q 
minT(c\"), b"E Q 
minC(c\"), b"E Q 
To choose the reconfiguration scheme based on the basis model, in hierarchical order, 
number of resource comes in as the first priority, then the response time and last the cost of 
reconfiguration. This research does not focus on choosing an optimal decision. 
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There are some scenarios and sub-scenarios in finding the available resource based on 
Table 3-1, Table 3-2, and Table 3-3: 
Scenario 1: Redundant Resources available with critical service. 
One of the resources R. of a critical service is destroyed. It requires some resources to fix it. 
If there are enough redundant resources from the critical service, the problem can be easily 
fixed without affecting any other services. 
CSD,._,(a)has been destroyed, where a 2: I. If there is CSR,. .• (a) such that CSR,_.(a) 
2: CSD,. .• (a) then allocate CSR,._.(a). In this scenario, the response time and cost factor are 
not explicitly considered. Thus: 
N(J) =I 
T(J) = 1csR 
..• 
C(J) = CCSR 
.. 
J = CSR, ..• 
Example: 
Supposed that CSD,_,(a) = 5, fcsR,_, = 3 units time, CcsR,_, = 7 units cost and CSR12 (a)= 6. 
Since CSR, .• (a) > CSD,._.(a), then allocate 5 from CSR~,,(a). Therefore, the 
rcconfiguration scheme is J = CSR,_,, the reconfiguration time is T(J) = 3 units time, the 
rcconfiguration cost is C(J) = 35 units cost, and the number of involved resource is 
N(J) =I. 
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Scenario 2: Redundant resources available with the system. 
One of the critical resources R is destroyed. It requires some resources to fix it. Unfortunately 
there are only small number redundant resources. In this case, the recovery process will be 
fixed by adding resources from the unused/idle redundant resources of the system; from the 
master resource allocation controller. 
CSD,._,,(a) has been destroyed, where a~ I. If there is MUNR" (y) such that 
MUNI(,(y)"?_CSDy.b(a) then allocate MUNR,(y). Similar as scenario I, here the response 
time and cost factor are not explicitly considered. 
N(o) =I 
T(o) = cMUNR. 
ccol = cMUNR. 
o=MUNR, 
Example: 
Supposed that CSD,_ 2(a) = 5, no available CSDu (a), MUNR, (y) = 6, 1 MVNR, = 3 units time, 
c,uNR, = 5 units cost. Since MUNR"(y)"?_CSDy .• (a), then allocate 5 from MUNR"(y). 
Therefore the reconfiguration scheme is o = MUNR 2 , the reconfiguration time is T(o) = 3 
units time, the reconfiguration cost is C(o) = 25 units cost, and the number of involved 
resource is N ( o) = I . 
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Scenario 3: Released resources available with non-critical services. 
One of critical resources R is destroyed. It requires some resources to fix it. If there is not 
enough redundant resources of critical service and unused redundant of the system, the 
problem will be tixed if the recovery process takes another resource from released resource 
of non-critical service resources. 
CSD,_.(a) has been destroyed, where a;:: I. If scenario I and 2 fail, then look into the 
released resource of NCS. There are three possibilities in this scenario: 
Scenario 3.1: Released resources available with only one non-critical service. 
CSD,._,(a) has been destroyed, where a;:: I. If there is only one NCSR,._,(/3) such 
that NCSR,._, (jJ) 2: CSD r.• (a) then allocate NCSR,._, (jJ) . Thus: 
N(a) =I 




Supposed that CSDu (a)= 5, no available CSDu (a), no available MUNR, (y), NCSR,_ 2 (jJ) 
= 6. l.vcsH,_, = 3 units time, and cNcs•,., = 5 units cost. Since NCSR,._,(jJ) 2: CSDy.b(a), then 
allocate 5 from NCSR,_ 2 (fJ) . Therefore the reconfiguration scheme is a= NCSR1•2 , the 
reconfiguration time is T(a) = 3 units time, the reconfiguration cost is C(a) = 25 units cost, 
and the number of involved resource is N (a)= I . 
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Scenario 3.2 : Released resources available with one non-critical service. 
CSD, ..• (a) has been destroyed, where a~ I. If there are some NCSR •.. c(fJ) such that each 
NCSR ... c(fJ)?. CSD,. .• (a) then allocate NCSR •.. c(fJ) with condition resource response time 
min(t" ... ,t .. ) and resource cost is min(c, , ... ,c..). Thus: 
N(o) =I 
T(o) = min(t, , ... ,r .. ) 
C(o) = min(c,, ... ,c .. ) 
o= NCSR ... c 
Example: 
Supposed that CSD~,2 (a)= 5, no availableCSD1•2 (a), no availableMUNR2 (y), and there are 
three possibilities NCSR •.. c: 
NCSR,_2 (fJ) = 6, 1 Ncs•.., = 3 units time, cNcsR,_, = 5 units cost 
NCSR2_2(fJ)= 7, INcsR.., = 6 units time, cNCSR,_, = 5 units cost 
NCSR,_,(fJ)= 8, tNcs•. = 2 units time, cNcsR = 6 units cost 
J.. 1.1 
All of NCSR ... c(fJ)?.CSD,. .• (a), tn this condition, 5 units resource are allocated from 
NCSR, (fJ) because it has the minimum response time. Therefore the reconfiguration 
scheme is o = NCSR3_2 , the reconfiguration time is T(t5) = 2 units time, the reconfiguration 
cost is C(o) = 30 units cost, and the number of involved resource is N(t5) =I. 
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Srcnario 3.3: Released resources available with combination of non-critical services. 
CSD, ..• (a) has been destroyed, where a:"': I. If there are some NCSR ... ,(/3) such that each 
NCSR,.._,(/3) <CSD,._.(a) , the allocation process can combine those NCSR.,,,(/3) then 
" 
satisfied L NCSR ... ,(/3) > CSDy .• (a). So there will be some o, ... , o, with 
..... ] 
C(o,) = c 1 + ... +c., as the cost of each combination and T(o,) = max(r, ... , t ..)as the response 
" 
time of the combination, then allocate l_NCSR.,_,(/3) with condition min(C(o1), ... ,C(o,)), 
w=l 
min(T(o, ), ... , T(o, J) and min(N(o, ), ... , N(o,)). Thus: 
N(o) = min(N(o1 ), ... , N(o, J) 
T(o) = min(T(o1 ) .... , T(o,)) 
C(o) = min(C(o1 ), ... , C(o, )) 








/ Scheme 1 
// .·· Scheme 2 
/ .·· / .·· Scheme 3 
/.·· 
/'. 
Figure 3-8: Possible schemes ror Scenario 3.3 
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Example: 
Supposed that CSD,, 2 (a)= 5, no availableCSDu(a), no availableMUNR2 (y), anclthere are 
three NCSR ... , that possible to be combined: 
NCSR,,1(/3)= 2, tNcs•,., = 3 units time, cNcsR,,, = 5 units cost 
NCSR1.2 (jJ) = 3, t NcsR,,, = 6 units time, cNCSR,., = 5 units cost 
NCSR,,,(/3)= 4, t,,·cs•,., = 4 units time, cNcs•,., = 6 units cost 
Scheme I: J, = {(NCSR~,, ). (NCSR2•2 )} , 
where NCSR~,1 (/3)=2and NCSR1.2(/3)=3. T(J1)=6, C(o1)= 10+ 15=25. 
Scheme 2: <5"2 = {(NCSR,.1 ),(NCSR,,,)}, 
where NCSR,,, (jJ) = 2 and NCSR,., (jJ) = 3. T(o,) = 4, C(o,) = I 0 + 18 = 28. 
Scheme 3: J, = {(NCSR2. 2 ). (NCSR,,, )} , 
where NCSR2.2 (/3)=3and NCSR3•2(/3)=2. T(<5"3 )=6, C(J3 )= 15+8=23. 
In this condition, since all scheme has the same number of involved resource, 5 units 
resource are allocated from 02 because it has the minimum response time. Therefore the 
reconfiguration scheme is o = {(NCSR,. 2 ), (NCSR,,, )}. the reconfiguration time is T(o) = 4 
units time, the reconftguration cost is C(o) = 28 units cost, and the number of involved 
resource is N(o) = 2. 
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Scenario 4: Resources are pre-empted from non-critical services. 
One of critical resources R is destroyed. It requires some resources to fix it. If there is not 
enough redundant resources of critical service, unused redundant of the system and released 
resource of non-critical service, the problem will be fixed if the recovery process pre-empts 
some resources from non-critical service resources that currently used. 
CSD,._,(a) has been destroyed, where a 2': I. If none of the scenario I, 2, and 3 can fulfil the 
recovery, then pre-empt from the currently used resource of NCS. There are three 
possibilities in this scenario: 
Scenario 4.1: Resources are pre-empted from only one non-critical service. 
CSD,..• (a) has been destroyed, where a 2': I. If there is only one NCSCU .. _,(/3) such 
that NCSCU .. _,(/3)?. CSD,._.(a) then allocate NCSCU ... ,(/3). Thus: 
N(o) =I 
T(o) = INcscu_., 
C(o) = cNcscu_,. 
O= NCSCU •. _, 
Example: 
Supposed that CSD1.2 (a)= 5, no available CSD1.2 (a), no available MUNR2 (y), no 
available NCSR,..,(/3), and NCSCU 1.2(j3) = 6, INcscu,_, = 3 units time, and cNcscu,_, = 5 units 
cost. Since NCSCU •. _,(jJ)?.CSD,. .• (a), then allocate 5 fromNCSR1•2 (jJ). Therefore the 
rcconfiguration scheme is o = NCSCU,_ 2 , the reconfiguration time is T(O) = 3 units time, the 
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reconfiguration cost is C(J) 
N(/5) = I . 
25 units cost, and the number of involved resource is 
Scenario 4.2: Resources are pre-empted from one non-critical service. 
CSD, .. ,(a) has been destroyed, where a<: I. If there are some NCSCU ... ,(fJ) such that each 
NCSCU ... ,(fJ)?. CSD,.• (a) then allocate NCSCU ... ,(fJ) with resource response time 
111 in (t, , ... , 1,.) and resource cost is min (c, , ... , c,.) . Thus: 
N(/5)= I 
T(/5) = min(/ 1 , ••• , t .. ) 
C(o) = min(c,, ... ,c .. ) 
o=NCSCU ... , 
Example: 
Supposed that CSD1•2 (a)= 5, no available CSD1•2 (a), no available MUNR, (y), no 
available NCSR, .. , (/]), and there are three possibilities NCSCU ... , : 
NCSCU~., (/]) = 6, t Ncscu,., = 3 units time, cNcscu,., = 5 units cost 
NCSCU,.,(fJ)= 7, tNcscu,., = 6 units time, cNcscu,., = 5 units cost 
NCSCU 3.2((J) = 8, tNcscu,., = 2 units time, cNcscu.., = 6 units cost 
All of NCSCU ... ,(fJ)?. CSDr.•(a), in this condition, 5 units resource are allocated from 
NCSCU 3.2 (/]) because it has the minimum response time. Therefore the reconfiguration 
scheme is o = NCSCU '·', the reconfiguration time is T(/5) = 2 units time, the reconfiguration 
cost is C(/5) = 30 units cost, and the number of involved resource is N(/5) =I. 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 37 
Scenario 4.3: Resources are pre-empted from combination of non-critical services. 
CSD,..,(a) has been destroyed, where a~ I. If there are some NCSCU ... ,(fJ) such that each 
NCSCU,.,(fJ) <CSD, .. ,(a) we can combine those NCSCU ... ,(fJ) then satisfied 
" 
'[_NCSCU, .. ,(fJ)~CSD,..,(a). So there will be some b'w·•b';with C(b',)=c1 + ... +c,as the 
.,.::] 
cost of each combination and T(b';) = max(t 1 , ••• ,t..}as the response time of the combination, 
" 
then allocate I NCSCU ... ,(fJ) 
w::] 
min(T(b'1), ••• ,T(b',)). Thus: 
N(b') = min(N(b', ), ... , N(b', J) 
T(b') = min(T(b'1 ), ••• , T(b'; )) 
C( b') =min( C(b', ), ... , C( b', )) 








with condition min( C( b', ), ... , C( b',)) 
/ .·· 
I : , .·· 
I_: ,,.., . 
I : _... '_ .... 
I: "".·· 
,.. /:: ... 
,_. "'<· · · Scheme 1 
1:" /. .. 
,.. Scheme 2 
Scheme 3 
figure 3-9: Possible schemes for Scenario 4.3 
and 
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Example: 
It . is supposed that CSD,_,(a) = 5, no available CSDu (a), no available MUNR, (y), no 
available NCSR, .. , (/]),and there are three NCSCU w.c that possible to be combined: 
NCSCU,,, (/]) = 2, l.vcscu,., = 3 units time, C.vcscu,., = 5 units cost 
NCSCU 2_2 (/3) = 3, 1 Ncscu,,, = 6 units time, cNcscu,_, = 5 units cost 
NCSCU 1_2 (/3) = 4, I Ncscu..., = 4 units time, cNcscu,_, = 6 units cost 
Scheme 1: a, ={(NCSCU,,~(NCSCU,_,).(NCSCU,,,)}, 
where NCSCU,_, (/]) = I, NCSCU 2 .2 (/3) = 2 and NCSCU 1•2 (/]) = 2. T(a,) = 6, C(a,) = 5 
+ 10+ 12=27. 
Scheme 2: a,= {(NCSCU,, 2 ~ (NCSCU3.2 ~ (NCSCU2•2 )} , 
where NCSCU,,(/3)= I, NCSCU 3.2(/3)= 3 and NCSCU 2•2 (/3)= I. T(a2 )= 6, C(a2 )= 5 
+ 18 + 5 = 28. 
Scheme 3: a, = {(NCSCU 2 2 ). (NCSCU 3. 2 )}, 
where NCSCU 2•2 (/])= 2 and NCSCU 3•2 (/3) = 3. T(a3 )= 6, C(a3 )= 10 + 18 = 28. 
In this condition, 5 units resource are allocated from a3 because it has the minimum number 
of involved resources. Therefore the reconfiguration scheme is 
a= {(NCSCU 2•2 ), (NCSCU 1_2 )}, the reconfiguration time is T(a) = 6 units time, the 
reconfiguration cost is C(a) = 28 units cost, and the number of involved resources is N(a) = 
2. 
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3.3.6 General Interconnected Network Recovery Model 
It will often be a case that a system will run out of resources when multiple concurrent 
faults occur. Running out of resources means all the possible resources are already "booked" 
for other reconfigurations or are currently being used. In this circumstance, the faulted 
system will broadcast the resources needed for reconfiguration in the network. The 
broadcasted parameter will be captured and compared with only the Master Unused Resource 
(MUNR). In the recovery process, the other system request will be queued as normal. The 





















Figure 3·10: the Interconnected Network 
Figure 3-10 shows the abstract interconnected networks graph. It has three systems 
with the same services structure. Each system has a recovery engine to perform the resource 
reconfiguration. The system consist of a set of network is 0 = {01,02 , ... ,0;}. The 
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hroadcasred parameter will contain (.n,, CS, .. CSD,.,, (a)), where D., is the faulted system 
that sends the parameter, CS,. is the destroyed service, and CSD ,. .• (a) is the damaged 
service with its amount. The response parameter will contain 
(n,,CS,.,CSD,. .• (a),D.,,MUNR,(y)), where D., is the system that responses the parameter, 
and MUNR,(y) is the resource amount of D., that will be used for the reconfiguration. To 
resolve this situation, initially, it is assumed that there is an at least one system respond the 
message with available resources. This assumption is raised because the system has no fail 
state. There are three other cases: 
Case 1: Only one system responds with sufficient resources. 
In this case, the faulted system will obviously use the MUNR.(y) of the system that responds 
for reconfiguring the damaged resource. 
Example: 
There is a broadcasted parameter (D.,CS,CSD~,2 (4l) and only one system responds by 
(n,,cs,,CSD, ,(4),D.,,MUNR,(4)) where I n, = 3 units time and c n, of n, = 3 units 
·- - MUNR2 MUNR2 
cost. In this case, the MUNR2 (4) of D.2 will be re-allocated. Therefore, the reconfiguration 
scheme is o = MUNR~', the reconfiguration time is T(o) = 3 units time, the reconfiguration 
cost is C(o) = 3 units cost, and the number of involved resources is N(o) = I. 
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Case 2: There are more than one systems respond each with at least the required number of 
resources. 
In this case, the faulted system will then select the resource that satisfies the requisite 
























,/<0, CS, CSD, 2(!:) 0 3 MUNR<(!:)> 
/ 
Figure 3-11: Interconnected Network Recovery ror Case 2 
System A ( n,) broadcasts a request parameter (n,CS,CSDu(5)) within the network as in 
Figure 3-11. The parameter indicates 5 units of resource 2 from critical service I of system 
A. There are two systems ( n, and n,) that have the needed resource. If t NR' = 3 unit time, 
- MU 1 
cMu.v•i = 6 unit cost, tMuN•! = 4 unit time, and cMUNR! = 4 unit cost, the recovery process will 
take the MUNRi, master controller resource from n, because it has the minimum response 
time. 
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Case 3: There are more than one systems respond each with less than the required number of 
resources. In this case, a scheme has to be devised to select the best combination. 
63, 
<0, CS, CSD,(S)> 
<0, CS, CSD,(S) O, MUNR,(3)> 
<O· c~. <0, CS, CSD,(S) O, MUNR,(3)> 
Figure 3-12: Interconnected Network Recovery for Case 3 
Example: 
System A ( n,) broadcasts a request parameter ( n,, CS, CSD~., (5)) within the network as in 
Figure 3-12 : Interconnected Network Recovery for Case 3. The parameter indicates 5 units 
of resource 2 from critical service I of system A. There are three systems ( n,, n, and n,) 
that respond the message. If 1 MUNR! = 3 units lime, cMUNR! = 7 units cost, 1 MUNRi = 4 units time, 
c , = 6 units cost, 1 uvR' = 5 units time, and cMUNR,' = 6 units cost, the recovery will have 
MUNHi M • 1 
four combinations of MUNR: 
Scheme 1: 0, = {MUNRi ,MUNR;}, 
where MUNRi(Y)=2and MUNRi(Y)=3, T(o,)=4, N(0,)= 14+ 18=32. 
Scherne 2: o2 = {MUNRJ ,MUNR; }, 
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where MUNRi(Y) = 2 and MUNR;(y) = 3, T(t52 )= 5, N(t52 ) = 14 + 18 = 32. 
Scheme 3: S, = {MUNRi ,MUNR; }, 
where MUNRi(Y)= 3 and MUNRi(Y)=2, T(t53)= 5, N(t53)= 18 + 12 = 30. 
Scheme 4: S, = {MUNRi ,MUNR; }, 
where MUNRi(Y)=2and MUNRi(y)=3, T(t53)=5, N(t53 )= 12+ 18=30. 
In this scenario, 5 units resource are allocated from J, to the faulted system i11 because it 
has the minimum response time. 
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3.3.7 Recovery Algorithm 
In this section, the full algorithm is provided in pseudo-code form. It starts with initial 
condition where there is no damage, scenarios process, and then diagnoses, analysis, and 
allocation respectively. See Figure 3-13. 
1. Initially set cso - null 
2. Let CSD be the input of the process 
3. Diagnose(CSD); set Queue; Analyze(CSD) 
4. while (not CSD - O) do 
4.1 if cs_redundant > cso then 
4.1.1 allocate(cs_redundant) 
4.1.2 else allocate(CS_redundant); 
4.1.3 CSD :- CSD- CS_redundant; 
4.1.4 time1 :- .cs_redundant_time; 
4.1. 5 cost1 :- cs_redundant_cost; 
4.2 if system_unused_redundant > cso then 
4.2.1 allocate(system_unused_redundant) 
4.2.2 else allocate(system_unused_redundant); 
4.2.3 CSD :- CSD- system_unused_redundarit; 
4.2.4 time2 :- system_unused_redundant_time; 
4. 2. 5 cost2 :- system_unused_redundant_time; 
4.3 if NCS_redundant > CSD then 
4.3.1 allocate(NCS_redundant) 
4.3.2 else allocate(NCS_redundant); 
4.3.3 CSD :- CSD- NCS_redundant; 
4.3.4 time3 :- NCS_redundant_time; 
4.3.5 cost3 :- NCS_redundant_cost; 
4.4 if NCS_used > CSD then 
4.4.1 allocate(NCS_used) 
4.4.2 else allocate(NCS_used); 
4.4.3 CSD :- CSD - NCS_used; 
4.4.4 time4 :- NCS_used_time; 
4.4.5 cost4 :- NCS_used_cost; 
4. 5 broadcast(CSD) 
4.5.1 allocate(other_system_unused_redundant); 
4. 5.2 CSD ·:- cso- o'ther_sys"tem_unused_redundant; 
4.5.3 timeS :- other_sys1:em_unused_redundan1:_1:ime; 
4.5.4 cos1:S :- o'ther_system_unused_redundant_cost; 
5. num :- counc(resource_used); 
6. Lime := max(Limel,Lime2,time3,Lime4,time5); 
7. cost :- sum(cos1:1, cost2, cost3, cost4, cos1: 5); 
8. outpu1: :- possible_scheme(min(num),min(1:ime),min(cos1:)); 
9. final_cime :- 'time_of_scheme; 
10. final_cos't :- cos't_of_scheme; 
Figure 3·13: Recovery Algorithm 
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The flowchart of the algorithm is placed in APPENDIX. Since optimization is beyond 
the scope of this research, the engine does not incorporate optimization functions based on 
response time, resource cost, and resource amount. 
3.4 Summary 
This thesis is proposing a different model of recovery in the fault tolerance area. The 
model deals with destroyed critical service in a system and considering some scenarios to 
reconfigure the resources. The consideration of all the possible available resources and 
requisite conditions are taken to build a survivable system. 
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CHAPTER 4 : SPECIFICATION AND SIMULATION MODEL 
The developed model needs to be proven. A widely used formal specification language was 
chosen as the engine state proofing. The development a simulation model was created to 
affirm the model. A further discussion on some case studies is carried out. 
4.1 Z Notation 
The Z notation is one of the best known formal methods which is often declared as a 
formal specification language and which is gaining widespread acceptance as a useful means 
of specifying software systems. The Z notation is a descriptive method with a medium level 
of formality. That is the method can be used together with computer·aided tools. In the sense 
of a specification language it is model oriented, based upon the set theory and mathematical 
logic, i.e. it is based on model design which is given by description of the system state and 
operations over this state. The representation, structure and meaning of the formal part of 
specification, written in the Z notation, is defined in the draft standard. 
In the Z notation there are two languages: the mathematical language and the schema 
language. The former is used to describe different aspects of design: objects and the 
relationships between them. The latter is used to structure and compose descriptions: 
collating pieces of information, encapsulating them and naming them for re-use [Woodcock, 
1996]. 
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4.2 Formal Z Notation 
In this section a way of Z specification design is presented with brief explanation of 
particular parts. First is the declaration of the basic set types of the processes. The model 
need to deal with damaged resource and redundant resource. For reconfiguration purposes, it 
will not matter what form these damages and resources take, hence the set of damage and 
redundant will be: 
[DAMAGE, RESOVR.CE]: 
Without saying what kind of object they contain is allowed in Z to be named to those sets. 
The first aspect of the system to describe is its state space. It is shown in a schema: 
__ ,ecoveryEngine ------------------
csd: P DAMAGE 
recover: DAMAGE-+> RESOURCE 
csd = dom recover 
This consists of a part above the central dividing line, in which some variables are declared, 
and a part below the line which gives a relationship between the values of the variables. 
csd is the set of damages and recover is a function which, when applied to certain damages, 
gives the redundant resource to repair it. 
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,--Diagnose---------------------
'2RecoveryEngine 
csdl: P DAMAGE 
csdl = csd 
48 
The tirst operation in the recovery engine is diagnosing where the damage has taken placed. 
For that operation, the engine makes no state changes, indicated by '2 notation, and only 
checks from the set of DAMAGE to get csd! as the output. 
.---!i,_,queue · ----· ---- ---- -·-------------------------l 
items: seq DAMAGE 
items': seq DAMAGE 
",-Analyze ___________________ _, 
'2RecoveryEngine 
csdl: P DAMAGE 
D.queue 
item?, item/: DAMAGE 
3items": seq DAMAGE 
• items" = items- (item?) A items" -..e 0 A items"= (item/)- items' 
ij csd/ = {item/) 
In general process, the analysis part is akin with diagnosis part. There is no state change 
within the process. The schema has a queue process that has state change, indicated by !-., 
before queue and after queue, consists of add items and leave items. The output below the 
line is the amount of csd'. result of the queue. 
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dam' E csd 
recover'= recover(!) {(dam?>-> reds ?)I 
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Next is the allocation part. Here, the schema formed in general condition of each scenario. 
Since this process has a significant result, move to good state, hence it has a state change of 




To finish the specification, the initial state of the recovery process must be presented. The 
schema above is presenting the initial state of the recovery process. 
4.3 Simulation Model 
As mentioned in previOus section, the recovery process contains three actions, 
diagnose, analyze, and allocation. The recovery process is connected to the tables of 
resources i.e. master allocation table, critical service tables and non-critical service tables. 
13ased on those tables, the process will check the availability of possible resource for 
reconfiguration purposes. The simulation model is shown in Figure 4-1. This simulation is 
created merely to simulate how the proposed model works. 
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if Recovery Simulation l!llil£1 
AesOUiceArnount J ReSOUtce Time J Resource Cost J 
S~ngle F~ult 
Sequential F auks 





f Reso.jt --n 
Recovery Scheme I 
Log Process I 
0:00:00 ] 
Figure 4-1 : Resource Quantity User Interface 
The simulation contains three action panels and three data pages. The data page 
contains the resource quantity, resource response time and resource cost respectively. On the 
resource quantity page, the entire resource quantity follows the rules of Resource Balancing. 
The page contains one grid for the master controller table, three grids for crittcal service table 
and three grids for non critical service table. All of the value in the grids can be changed 
manually. The fault panel contains three buttons for simulating the fault. Single fault button 
will trigger damage in a critical service grid. Sequential faults button triggers damages in two 
critical service grids. Concurrent faults button triggers damages in all critical service grids. 
The recovery actions buttons are placed in the next panel. Each button represents one 
recovery action. When the button is pressed, a pop up form will appear to show the result of 
each process. The result panel is to show the recovery scheme found and the log on entire 
process. 
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Figure 4-2 : Resource response time User Interface 
Figure 4-2 shows the response time of each occupied resource in the reconfiguration . 
User may input each value manually based on the data. The response time uses 'unit time ' as 
tts unit. 
Figure 4-3 : Resource cost User Interface 
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Figure 4-3 shows the resource cost of each involved resource in the reconfiguration. 
Each value in every cell is manually inputted like the response time. The resource cost is 
given 'unit cost' as its unit. 
4.3.1 Single Fault Case Study 
To test the first type of fault, this work uses one case study as shown graphically in 
hgure 4-4, the delivery unit system of post office. There is a central post office m a town and 
some branch offices in the suburban area. Each post office has a unit called delivery unit with 
its mail-man. Let say a group of mail-man is a resource, some suburban post offices are set as 
critical serv1ces, some other suburban post offices are set non-critical service and the central 




Figure 4-4 : Post Office Mail-Men Case Study 
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Figure 4-5 : Damage on one Critical Post Office 
Figure 4-5 shows some critical suburban post office resources of R2 being damaged, 
cal led CSD12 = 5, highlighted in circle. To fix the etTor, scenario I will be executed and 
check the office's redundant unit, CSR12 = 8. Since it ts enough, it is possible to execute the 
re'iource re-allocation process. Hence, to reconfigure 5 delivery units of CSD12 , the recovery 
process needs to allocate 5 units from CSR12 , see Figure 4-6. 
Ar Dtagnoslng Result l!llil 13 
Damage Oca.u n 
Cr•tea~ Setw:e 1 on Resource 2 
Figure 4-6 : Diagnose Result for Single Fault 
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The dtagnose process (Figure 4-6) is running to set where the damage has taken place. 
It shows CSD12 , which means the first critical suburban post office at mail-man group 2. 
•r Analysrs Result l!llill3 
Damage Atnol.ri 
Cribc~ SerVIce 1 on Resource 2 a 5lnt 
Figure 4-7 : Ana lysis Result for Single Fault 
Ftgure 4-7 shows the analyst s outcome based on diagnosed parameters. It says that 5 
umts of mail-man of group 2 are in faulted, CSD12 (a)= 5. 
:;fAUocation Result l!llill31 
Resource Possibility 
Redundanl Cr~~ Servrce 1 on Resource 2 • 5lnt 
Figure 4-8 : Allocation Result for Single Fault 
Figure 4-8 shows the allocation process, the last part of recovery process. Since 
CSR12 (a) ~ CSD12 (a), then allocate 5 units from CSR12 , the redundant delivery units of first 
critical suburban post office. 
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Figure 4-9 shows the recovery scheme, final response time, and final cost as the result 
of the recovery process for single fault. 0: CSR12 , T(O) = 5 units time, C(O) = 5 x 8 = 40 
un1t cost, and N(O) = 1. 
.ol' R~cov~ry Sch~m~ Jl!!lliJ E3 
Re$0Uce Reconligu!Koon Scheme 
R~nt D~IC~ SetYICe 1 on Re$ovrce 2 • 5 <nt 
T me • 5 unltlrne 
Co$t • 40 co;t tme 
- -
Figure 4-9 : Feasible Recovery Scheme for Single Fault 
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4.3.2 Multiple Sequential Faults Case Study 
If another error occurred to one other group of mail-man of the critical post office after 
the first critical service being in fault, it means sequential faults has occurred. 
Figure 4-10 : Multiple Sequential Faults Case 
Figure 4-10 shows another urban critical post office (CSJ) is in fault after the first 
critical post office (CSJ), highlighted m 2"d red circle. 7 mall-man umts of group 2, CSD ~are 
damaged after 5 mail-man units of group 2 of CSJ. 
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Damage Occurs n 
urbcal SerVICe 1 0t1 Reswce 2 
Crlllea Service 3 0t1 Res01.1ce 2 
Figure 4-11 :Sequential Faults Diagnosed Result 
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Figure 4-11 shows the diagnosed results of both errors. It shows where they have taken 
placed. The errors occurred in CSD12 and CSD32 • 
• y Analysis Result l!!!llill3 
Damage Amou1l 
mteal SerVICe 1 on RMwce 2 • 5 <rot 
u•teal SerVICe 3 0t1 Aesouce 2 • 7 <rot 
Figure 4-12 : Analysed Results for Sequential Faults 
Figure 4-12 shows the result of analysis part of the engine for this case. It shows 5 
main-man units of group 2 of critical post office 1 and 7 mail-man units of group 2 of critical 
post office 2 are being faulted. CSD12 (a)= 5 units and CSD32 (a)= 7 units. 
For CSD12 (a)= 5, it will check the redundant delivery units from its service. 
Since CSR12 (a)~ CSD12 (a), then allocate 5 units from CSR12 • The same action goes to the 
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next errors; CSD32 (a)= 7. SinceCSR32 (a) < CSD32 (a) , the scenario 2 will be activated. The 
idle mail-man of the central post office will be checked. MUNR2 (r) = 4 units. It means, to fix 
the remaining 2 units of damaged resources; the analysis process may take from the central 
post office idle resources. Consequently, the balance of MUNR2 (r) will be 2 resources . 
~I" Allocation Result l!!llill3 
A esource Possibaity: 
RedJndant Crrtical Service 1 on Resource 2 ~ 5 unrt 
Reoilld<Y>t Crrtic.>l Service 1 on Resource 2 • 5 urot 
Idle Redundant of System on Resource 2 ~ 2 Ul1ll 
Figure 4-13: Allocation result for sequential faults 
The allocation process results are shown in Figure 4-13. It shows that to fix 7 damaged 
resources of the second error, 5 units of mail-man will be taken from the redundant resources 
of its service and 2 units of mail-man taken from idle redundant of central post office. There 
is no other feasible scheme of this allocation. 
•I" Recovery Scheme l!!llill3 
Resource Reconf~Quralron Scheme: 
Redundant Cr~ical SerVICe 1 on Resource 2 • 5 un~ 
Trne • 5 unttrme 
Cost ~ 40 unit cost 
Redundant Crrlrcal Servoce 3 on Resource 2 • 5 un~ 
Idle Redundant ol System on Resource 2 • 2 unll 
Tme • 8 unt time 
Cost • 29 unit cost 
Figure 4-14 : Feasible Scheme for sequential faults 
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Finally, in Figure 4-14, the scheme of reconfiguration provided by this engine is 
displayed. For the first error o, = {CSR12 }, T(o,) = 5, and C(o,) = 40. For the next 
error.?,= {CSR,,MUNR,}, T(o,)= 8, and C(o,)= 29. 
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-J.3.3 Multiple Concurrent Faults Case Study 
For multiple concurrent faults type, lets take a computer server system network of a 
company. The company has three critical servers supporting the service for its customers; 
web server. mail server, and administration server. To support the server process, every 
-;erver needs some resources, such as connection, electric power, and its computer 
peripherals. Some non-critical servers also presented for other services. Figure 4-15 depicts 
thts scenan o. 
Maol Server 
~~v ~ 






Figure 4-15 : Computer Server Systems Network 
--
~ 
Let the web server, mail server, and administration server is the CSI' CS2 and 
CS respectively. The level of web server = 1, mail server= 2, and administration server = 3. 
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Level I is more important than level 3. The connection, electric power, and computer 
penpheral are the resources. The other servers are the non critical services 
For example, multiple concurrent faults occurred to all the CS. The faults destroyed the 
electric power of all critical servers. If the three reconfiguration requests arrive in the same 
t11ne and the critical serv1ce level is L, : {1 ,2,3}, the queue will be 
Q: {(CSD.,,bsrr\'u ), (CSDmail serwr ), (CSDadrrun tstratwnsmrr )} • 
ResauceAmoo.ri Resouoce Trne I Resouce Co$11 
Ma$tet Corboler- uo~JcajSeMCeS- • Non CtUcal S eMCes 
Figure 4-16 : Initial State of the network 
Figure 4-16 shows the initial condition of the system at normal state. Each service has 
20 units required resources and 4 units redundant for each resource. The master controller has 
4 units idle/unused redundant for each resource. There is no damage happened in any service . 
The MQR(y) = 120 means the summary of all required resources in all services for one type 
of resource. 
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Rescuce Amount Resource T 11ne 
Master !Ariloler 
'I. 
Figure 4-17: Resource response time of the network 
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Figure 4-17 shows response time of the resources that will be used in the 
reconfigu ration of multiple concurrent fau lts. The response time means the duration of time 
taking the resources to be re-allocated to the faulty services. 
Rescuee AmOU'llj Resou~ee T me Resource Cost 
Figure 4-18 : Resource cost of the network 
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Figure 4-18 shows the cost of each resource to be taken for the reconfiguration of 
multiple concurrent faults. 
24 24 
co 
Figure 4-19: Multiple Concurrent Faults 
Figure 4-19 shows where the errors occurred and their amount. 15 units on Critical 
Service I (Web Server) at Resource 2, 17 units on Critical Service 2 (Mail Server) at 
Rt!source 2, and I 0 units on Critical Service 3 (Administrator Server) at Resource 2. 
Resource 2 is the electric power. 
m~-·, ,. - -,x 
Damage Oce~.u n 
Cnhcal SeiV!ce 1 on ResOlA'ce 2 
Crii!C41 Servoce 2 on ResOlA'ce 2 
Crllocal S ervoce 3 on A esOlA'ce 2 
Figure 4-20: Diagnosis result of Multiple Concurrent Faults 
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The diagnosed results can be seen in Figure 4-20 as the beginning process of recovery. 
The tigure shows damages happen on CSD12 , CSD22 , and CSD32 • 
• , Andlysrs Result l!lliJ E3 
Cnbcal Se1V1Ce 1 on Resouce 2 • 15l1111 
Cntcal SerVICe 2 on R esouce 2 • 17 unol 
Cntctll S ervrce 3 on R erouce 2 • 1 0 unol 
Figure 4-21 : Analysis result or Multiple Concurrent Faults 
Figure 4-2 1 shows the damage amount resulted by analysis process. The amount is 
captured by tracing the place of damage identified in previous process. CSD12 (a)= 15, 
-'I" Allocation Result 1!1. f3 
ReO.n:lant Non Critical Servrce 2 on Re;ource 2 • 9 unot 
ReO.n:lant Non Cntcal Servrce 1 on Re1001ce 2 • 2 o..nit 
Redl.ndant Cncal Service 2 on Re;ource 2 • 6 unot 
Redrodant Non Critical SerVICe 3 on Re;ource 2 • 9 unot 
Redl.ndant Non Critical Servrce 1 on Re;ource 2 • 2 unol 
Redl.ndant C00ca SeMc:e 2 on Re;ource 2 • 6 unol 
Redl.ndant Non Cr~ical Serw:e 3 on Resouce 2 • 9 unol 
ReO.ndant Non Critical Setvice 2 on Resource 2 • 2 unol 
ReO.n:lant Cr~JClll SeMc:e 3 on Resource 2 • 10 unol 
Figure 4-22 : Allocation result or Multiple Concurrent Faults 
Figure 4-22 shows the allocation result of recovery process. The possible resources are 
chosen by the scenario. In this case, none of the non-critical service resources are being pre-
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cmptccl for the reconfiguration purpose. The detail process is shown in Table 4-1 :Allocation 
Process for Multiple Concurrent Faults. Rows with grey colour are the solution based on 
hierarchical decision. 
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Tahlc 4-1 :Allocation Process for Multiple Concurrent Faults 
Damage Feasible Schemes Response Time Cost Resource Number 
CSR12 (7), MUNR2 (4), NCSR12 (4) max(9,7,7) = 9 7*6 + 4*9 + 4*7 = 106 3 
CSD12 (15) CSR12 (7), MUNR,(4), NCSR22 (4) max(9,7,6)= 9 7*6 + 4*9 + 4*2 = 86 3 
CSR 12 (7), MUNR,(4), NCSR32 (4) max(9,7 ,5) = 9 7*6+4*9+4*8= 110 3 
CSR, (6), NCSR12 (9), NCSR22 (2) max(5,7,6) = 7 6*7 + 9*7 + 2*2 = 109 3 
CSR22 (6), NCSR, (9), NCSR31 (2) max(5,7,5)= 7 6*7 + 9*7 + 2*8 = 121 3 
CSR22 (6), NCSR22 (9), NCSR32 (2) max(5,6,5) = 6 6*7 + 9*2 + 2*8 = 76 3 
CSD, (17) 
CSR, (6), NCSR22 (9), NCSR12 (2) max(5,6,7) = 7 6*7 + 9*2 + 2*7 = 74 3 
CSR22 (6), NCSR32 (9), NCSR12 (2) max(5,5,7) = 7 6*7 + 9*8 + 2*7 = 128 3 
CSR22 (6), NCSR32 (9), NCSR, (2) max(5,5,6) = 6 6*7 + 9*8 + 2*2 = 118 3 
CSD32 (10) CSR32 (10) 3 10*2 = 20 1 
-- ---- ---- ----- --
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fi!'Rec:overy Sl.heme 
Aerundant Critical Service 1 cr1 Aescuce 2 • 7 unit 
Ide Re~ ol SY$tem on Re$(1U1Ce 2 • 4lri 
Redundant Non Crilica Service 2 on Rescuce 2 • 41rit 
Time • 9 unit tine 
Co~ • 86 unit cost 
ReWndant Critical Service 2 cn Resource 2 • 6 unit 
Redundant ~/on Critical Service 2 Ol'l Re~ouce 2 • 9 unit 
AeO.Jndant Non mica! Service 3 on Aes01.1ce 2 • 2 unit 
Tine • 6 unit tine 
Co:! • 76 unit cost 
Redund,nt Ccitical Service 3 on Resource 2 • 10 unit 
·- G X 
Figure 4-23 : Recovery Schemes or Multiple Concurrent Faults 
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The last result of recovery process is shown in Figure 4-23. The reconfigurations based 
on feasible schemes are: 
5, : {CSR12 , MUNR,, NCSR 22 }, T(5,) = 9 unit time, C(5, )= 86 unit cost, N(5, )= 3 
52 : {CSR 22 , NCSR 22 , NCSR32 }, T(5, )= 6 unit time, C(52 )= 76 unit cost, N(5,) = 3 
53 : {CSR32 }, T(5,)= 3 unit time, C(53 )= 20 unit cost, N(5,)= I 
4.4 Result and Analysis 
The interest of this research is to find a technique how to recover a damage service by 
reconfiguring its resources with minimum service disruption. There are some analysis of the 
model based on the simulation result and comparison to the closest work related to that 
interest: 
I. Based on the case study simulation, it is shown that the model is not limited to 
computer system, but also any system, as long as the system has the same architecture 
as mentioned in Figure 3.1. The model can solve multiple faults that happened to the 
same resource. 
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2. In Table 4-1, the hierarchical order based on requisite conditions is shown when the 
reconllguration scheme has to be chosen. It also shows that if the master idle resource 
has already booked, it will not book by other request. 
3. Compared to ERAS [Wang, 2006], the closest work to this research, the simulation 
shows that the developed model is capable of making a reconfiguration with minimal 
affection to the currently used (pre-empted) resources of any services. While ERAS can 
only reconfigure from pre-empted resources of non-critical service, this model has an 
advantage over ERAS in giving a more generic solution. 
4. The developed model can also handle three types of fault which is the common faults 
happen in the real situation. The priority queue makes every faults condition is possible 
to be solved. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has shown how the developed model works by specifying it ustng Z 
specification language and simulate it with some case studies. By specifying the model into 
formal model, it helps the other developers to understand the general logic of the process. 
The Z specification language has been proved using ZJEVES simulator. In the simulation 
part, the time efficiency of reconfiguration can be shown by minimally affecting another 
service. The model is very applicable to any system, not only computer system. The 
simulation can be called as a generic simulation because it demonstrates the model in every 
possible case. 
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CHAPTER 5 : CONCLUSION 
The research on survivability has become an interesting topic in the field of recovery, 
and one of its emphases is on how to improve the system abilities for damage recovery as 
conditions permit. In this research, a basis recovery model for survivable critical service 
based on resource reconfiguration has been developed. The model encompasses several 
detailed scenarios of resource re-allocation in reconfiguring the damaged system. The model 
assigned available redundant resources in the system to the critical services and pre-empting 
the currently used resources from non-critical services. This reconfiguration process in the 
developed model is a new approach in fault tolerance perspective. 
Based on the requisite conditions; resource response time, resource cost, and number of 
resources (especially the pre-emptive resources), the model has shown that is it very effective 
useful model. The model also addressed several fault types, namely single fault, multiple 
sequential faults, and multiple concurrent faults that may happen to the critical services. 
This work has defined the concept of 'resource balancing' and found it very useful to 
ensure the resource reconfiguration performs properly under various scenarios. 
This work also proposed a system architecture where the system can survive with the 
model developed. The system contains critical and non critical services also master resource 
controller. The system administrator will be the person in charge who set the system as the 
proposed architecture. 
Regarding to the Z formal specification which is created using ZJEVES, it is shown 
that formal specification can help in pre-implementation such model in any programming 
development. The proven logic of the specification helps in describing the model to 
programmers or common people. 
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The model developed here can help the system administrators make better decisions to 
enhance the survivability of the system. With real data, administrator should be able to 
achieve decisions closer to the optimal survivability. 
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CHAPTER 6 : FUTURE WORK 
There are several directions for future work. First, it is important to create the 
application of this model and implement it into a real-time system. Several case studies need 
to be considered, including the use of an agent application for each system. In real-time 
system, optimization mechanism could be used in the model. Redundancy optimization 
algorithms are being tested for efficiencies computability to determine its computational 
complexity. The optimization must include the three requisite conditions, specially the cost 
factor. 
A decision support system should also be built in the further research. The need of 
improved DSS based on requisite conditions and other factors such as Multi Criteria Decision 
1\'laking (MCDM) becomes important to reconfigure a damage resource accurately. 
With regards to many real-time systems that commonly include fail states; the success 
probability of recovery must be considered. Other quantification factors such as graceful 
degradation time limit and resource type can be taken into account to enhance the model. 
There are other redundancy mechanisms such as data/information redundancy, time 
redundancy, method redundancy and software redundancy that may be used to extend this 
work into a move advanced model. 
Some assumptions have been made in the development of the model; such as 
establishment of checkpoint, damage assessment, synchronization, and resource restoration 
are factors that are considered to have been taken care of by other mechanisms. They can be 
realised in future work. 
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The general interconnected network recovery model IS developed merely for 
generalizing the recovery within a network. The specification and simulation part of that 
model should be buill in future work. 
In autonomic computing, the next step of recovery in survivable system is self-healing 
system [Koopman, 2003]. This research is in fact one aspect of self-healing mechanisms that 
invokes recovery with minimal human intervention. There are many aspects that might be 
integrated into this model to develop a full scale self-healing system. 
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APPENDIX A: The Allocation Flowchart 
lc • nt$CI. • dam! 
L 
__ ,-11 ·~""· ~· L J remain damage j 
--------------.~r-----" 
mutV ~dam! 
Figure A-1: Allocation Flowchart 
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APPENDIX B: Simulation Program Code 
The simulation contains two main processes: the initial process and the recovery process. 
Figure B-1 illustrates the initial condition for the simulation. Meanwhile, Figure B-2 
illustrates the recovery process. 
II unit declaration 
Uses 
t<lindows, Messages, SysUtils, Variants, Classes, Graphics, 
Controls, Forms, Dialogs, Grids, StdCtrls, ComCtrls, ExtCtrls, 
Math; 
II grid naming 
procedure naming; 
begin 
Hith {grid_name) do 
begin 
II name the grid; 
end; 
end; 
II grid filling 
procedure filling; 
var 
i : integer; 
begin 
randomize; 
with {grid service} do 
begin 
for i:=l to 3 do 
II fill the grid 
end; 
end; 
Figure B-1: The Initial Condition Process 
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II Main Procedure 
procedure recovery; 
begin 
II define all the needed variable 
II while remain_damage <> 0 and result not found 
if {csr >= damage} then 
begin 
result := damage; 
num{x] := 1; 
time[t] csr_time; 
cost [c) csr_cost * result; 
end else 
if {csr < damage} then 
begin 
result := csr; 
rernain_damage 
num[x] := 1; 
damage - cs r; 
time [ t] : = csr_time; 
cost[c] csr_cost *result; 
damage := remain_damage; 
if {mstr >= damage} then 
begin 
result := result+damage; 
mstr := mstr - damage; 
num[x] := num[x] + 1; 
time[t] := max(time[t],mstr_time); 
cOst[c] := cost[c]+(mstr_cost*result); 
end else 
if {mstr < damage} then 
begin 
result := result+mstr; 
remain_damage := damage - mstr; 
num[x] := num[x] + 1; 
time [t] max (time [t.], mstr_time); 
cost [c] : = cost {c)+ (mstr_cost*result) i 
damage := remain_damage; 
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:= num[x] + {count(ncsr[m]) }; 
:= max(time[t],ncsr_time[m]); 
:= cost[c]+(damage * ncsr_cost[m]); 
end else 
if {ncsr[m] < damage} then 
begin 
result := result+ncsr[m); 
remain_damage := damage - result; 
num[x] :~ num[x] + {count(ncsr[m]) ); 
time { t] : = (max (time [t], ncsr_time [m]); 
cost[c] := cost[c)+(damage * ncsr_cost[m]); 
damage := remain_damage; 





num[x] + {count(ncscu[n)) }; 
time[t] := max(tirne[t],ncscu_time{n]); 
cost [c) cost [c)+ (damage * ncscu_cost [n]); 
end else 
if {ncscu[n] <damage) then 
begin 
result := result+ncscu[n]; 
remain_damage := damage - result; 
num[x] :~ num[x] + {count{ncscu[n])); 
time{t] := max(time[t},ncscu_time[n]); 
cost[c] cost[c]+(damage * ncscu_cost[n]); 
damage remain_damage; 
end; 
II choose the minimum {num[XJ and time[t] and cost[c]} 
II choose the best scheme for reconfiguration 
I I result found 
end. 
Figure B-2: The Recovery Process 
